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RECENT DECISIONS
store. Two of them gave confessions which were used upon the
trial, though they protested that they were involuntary. All were
tried together after motions for separate trials were denied. Upon
appeal from this denial and the alleged error in admitting the con-
fessions. Held, granting of separate trials is discretionary with the
trial judge and in the absence of abuse of that discretion, his decision
will not be disturbed upon review. The question of whether the
confessions were voluntary or not was properly submitted to the
jury. People v. Fisher, 249 N. Y. 419, 164 N. E. 336 (1928).
The correctness of the ruling on admissibility of confessions is
so well established that it merits little discussion. Here, as before,1
it was held that the statute governed. 2 The trial court, after a pre-
liminary hearing, may admit a confession, final decision as to its
probative value being left to the jury. The main ground for appeal
in the case rested on the denial of applications for separate trials.
At common law, persons jointly indicted could be tried jointly or
separately according to the discretion of the court. With enactment
of the Revised Statutes of 1826, this rule was changed. A defend-
ant so indicted could demand a separate trial or waive it and stand
trial with his co-defendants. In 1926 the common law was restored, 3
so that abuse of discretion is the only ground for appeal.4 The evi-
dence in this case was so overwhelming that expediency and economy
demanded a single trial. A dissenting opinion r disclaims the wis-
dom of this reasoning in view of one defendant's persistent denial
of guilt.
DAMAGES - MENTAL ANGUISH - NEGLIGENCE - TELEGRAPH
COMPANIEs.-Plaintiff's son was mortally wounded and a telegram
stating the seriousness of his condition was sent to her by his wife.
It was promptly dispatched and received at the destination office of
defendant which failed to deliver it until a time too late to permit
her reaching her son before death. Plaintiff brought action for
damages resulting from mental anguish. Held, for plaintiff. Gibbs
v. Western Union Tel. Co., 146 S. E. 209 (Sup. Ct., No. Car., 1929).
The matter of redressing mental anguish was the subject of fre-
quent consideration by common law courts It is the settled rule of
those courts that such anguish, when unaccompanied by bodily
injury is too intangible and remote to form a basis of recovery of
damages. They are allowable only where there has been bodily
injury causing physical pain and mental anguish cannot be dis-
'People v. Rogers, 192 N. Y. 331, 85 N. E. 135 (1908) ; 193 N. Y. 46, 85
N. E. 809 (1908) ; People v. Doran, 246 N. Y. 409, 159 N. E. 379 (1927).
2 Code Crim. Proc., Sec. 395.
3 Ibid. at 391.
'People ex rel. Flynn v. Woods, 218 N. Y. 124, 112 N. E. 915 (1916);
Matter of Whitman, No. 2, 225 N. Y. 21, 121 N. E. 485 (1918).
'By Lehman, J., 249 N. Y. at 428, 164 N. E. at 339.
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tinguished from the physical;' where there has been a malicious
invasion of the rights of another, damages being allowed not alone
as compensation but by way of punishment of the wrongdoer.
2
Courts in a few jurisdictions permit recovery for mental anguish
caused by the negligence of telegraph companies in failing to deliver
messages relating to sickness and death.' The reason for departure
from the common law rule is that "the telegraph is a public utility
of modern invention, endowed by the state with special privileges,
and charged with public duties; that neglect by its managers and
operators in the performance of these duties may cause mental
anguish to those it is required to serve.
4
EVIDENE-CRIMEs-AsSAuLT-TRIAL.--Two of the defend-
ants, Malkin and Franklin, were arrested immediately after a raid
upon a fur store, and identified by their victims. The other de-
fendants were arrested on information of one who had confessed his
guilt and been convicted. The attack in question arose out of the fur
strike of 1926, all defendants being members of the Joint Board
Furriers' Union. Defendants appeal from a judgment of conviction,
alleging that the District Attorney's conduct during trial was prejudi-
cial. Held, as to all but Malkin and Franklin, decree reversed. People
v. Malkin, 250 N. Y. 185 (1929).
The evident purpose of the prosecutor was to show that the
defendants were men prone to violence, and who, for that reason had
been condemned as a body by the American Federation of Labor.
He offered no evidence of prior assaults by defendants,' yet he ques-
tioned as to previous acts and confronted them with seven silent
witnesses propounding questions upon acts done in company with
them. The relations of the defendants with the A. F. of L. and
their expulsion therefrom were also a subject of examination by the
prosecuting attorney. All this was done over proper objection.
' Railway Commissioners v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222; Lynch v. Knight,
9 H. L. Cas. 577; Hobbs v. London, S. W. Ry. Co., 10 Q. B. 122.
'Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 50 N. W. 238 (1891) ; Francis v. Tel. Co.,
58 Minn. 252, 59 N. W. 1078 (1894) ; Railroad Co. v. Stabler, 62 II. 313 (1872).
' So. Relle v. Western Union Tel. Co., 55 Tex. 308, 40 Am. Rep. 805
(1881). The first adjudication to promulgate the minority rule. Adopted in
following states: Alabama, Western Union Tel. Co. v. Henderson, 89 Ala. 510,
7 So. 419 (1890); Iowa, Mentzer v. Western Union Tel Co., 93 Iowa 752, 62
N. W. 1 (1895); Kentucky, Taliferro v. Western Union Tel. Co., 21 Ky. L.
Rep. 1290, 54 S. W. 825 (1900) ; Nevada, Barnes v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
27 Nev. 438, 76 Pac. 931 (1904); North Carolina, Young v. Western Union
Tel. Co., 107 N. C. 370, 11 S. F 1044 (1890); Tennessee, Wadsworth v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 86 Tenn. 695, 8 S. W. 574 (1888).
" Rowan v. Western Union Tel. Co., 149 Fed. 550 (C. C. N. D. Iowa 1907)
at 552. This case along with the other cases in the Federal Courts and other
jurisdictions holding to the majority rule have vigorously maintained that there
is no sufficient reason for making an exception to the common law rule in the
case of actions against telegraph companies.
'People v. Molineux, 168 N. Y. 264, 61 N. E. 286 (1901).
